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Executive Summary
Segregation in schools and neighborhoods are closely related. Segregated neighborhoods, of
course, generate segregated neighborhood schools, but there is also feedback from school
characteristics to neighborhoods. Potential residents, especially families with children, evaluate
local schools when deciding where to live. This means that racial or social transition in
schools—and the record shows that schools can change character very rapidly—can accelerate
neighborhood transition. By the same token, stably integrated schools can stabilize
neighborhoods. Integrated neighborhoods are much more stable in metropolitan areas with largescale school integration programs. Housing and school policy must be coordinated.
At the same time, purely local approaches to integrate schools and neighborhoods have very
limited potential in a region like the Twin Cities with more than 200 municipalities and school
districts. When just a few cities and school districts are home to the overwhelming majority of
residents and students of color, a truly effective integration strategy must be regional in scope.
This policy brief summarizes the ills associated with these patterns, shows the existing pattern of
segregation in the Twin Cities, and describes how a coordinated regional approach to integration
using already existing programs could greatly reduce these ills.
Why Segregation Matters
Racial segregation is not just about race. It is also about access to jobs, good schools, and decent
economic prospects in life. Where one lives significantly determines the availability and quality
of opportunities such as public education, employment, and wealth accumulation and thus
dramatically impacts one’s life chances. To the extent that racial segregation limits people’s
residential choices, it undermines equality of opportunity.
Racial segregation in neighborhoods is particularly harmful because it creates segregation in
schools, adding another layer of costs for young people, undermining the region’s future. There
are a number of reasons to be greatly concerned about segregation in the region’s schools and to
pursue coordinated policies to increase integration in our schools.
Integrated schools help students of all races:
• Attending racially integrated schools and classrooms improves the academic achievement
of minority students, whether measured by test scores, attendance rates, graduation rates,
or the likelihood of attending college.
• Research also shows that integration helps to reduce the achievement gap between
students of different racial and ethnic groups.
• Minority students who attended integrated schools tend to choose more lucrative
occupations in which minorities are historically underrepresented and to have higher
incomes than their peers in segregated schools.
• Students who experience interracial contact in integrated school settings are more likely
to live, work, and attend college in more integrated settings.
• Interracial contact in desegregated settings decreases racial prejudice among students and
facilitates more positive interracial relations.
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•

Integrated schools enhance the cultural competence of white students, preparing them for
a more diverse workplace and society.

Integrated schools help communities. When implemented on a metro-wide scale:
• School integration can promote residential integration and enhance neighborhood
stability, preventing integrated neighborhoods from resegregating.
• Integration efforts can help communities avoid the disinvestment, declining housing
values and job losses often associated with economic and racial segregation.
• Revitalization of currently segregated inner city and inner suburb neighborhoods help the
entire regional economy.
Segregation in the Twin Cities
Segregation in schools and neighborhoods is increasing for most students and residents of color
in the Twin Cities, even as it is declining for whites. Increasing segregation in schools is
particularly important because non-white segregated schools are also largely high-poverty
schools. In 2008, 23 percent of Twin Cities elementary schools (or 108 schools) were non-white
segregated. 96 percent of these schools had free and reduced-price lunch eligibility rates greater
than 40 percent and 73 percent had rates greater than 75 percent.
The number of non-white segregated schools is increasing rapidly in the Twin Cities metro area.
In 1992, there were only nine, serving only one and a half percent of the region’s elementary
students. By 2008, there were 108 non-white segregated schools, representing 22 percent of the
region’s elementary students. Between 1992 and 2008, the percentage of white students in
segregated schools fell from 87 to 60 percent. But, at the same time, the percentages of black and
Hispanic students attending non-white segregated schools shot up from 14 to 51 percent for
black students and from 3 percent to 43 percent for Hispanics.
Chart 2
Percentage of Students in Segregated Settings by Race,
Twin Cities Metropolitan Area
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Being isolated in non-white segregated schools hurts students of color because these schools
typically have high concentrations of poverty. In 2008, the average poverty rate in the non-white
segregated schools in the Twin Cities metro was more than seven times the rate in predominantly
white schools and three times the rate in integrated schools. (Chart 3)
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As a result of these trends, elementary students of color in the Twin Cities metro are more than
five times as likely to attend schools with high concentrations of poverty (schools with free or
reduced-price eligibility greater than 40 percent) as white students—56 percent compared to 10
percent. The comparison is even starker for very high poverty schools (elementary schools with
free or reduced-price eligibility greater than 75 percent). Students of color are more than thirty
times as likely as white students to find themselves in very high poverty schools—29 percent
compared to less than 1 percent.
Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Revenue
Integration Revenue is extra funding meant to promote integration that is provided to Minnesota
school districts with racially isolated schools. But the program currently provides little or no
incentive for school districts to desegregate their minority and low-income students. The purpose
of the funding should be changed from “increasing interracial contact” to promoting the actual
integration of school districts, schools, and classrooms.
One way to do this is to modify the program’s funding formula for school districts in the Twin
Cities to create positive incentives for districts to integrate schools by rewarding districts on a
per student basis for documented pro-integrative student movements and for the number of
students currently attending integrated schools.
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The incentives should be designed to encourage pro-integrative strategies like magnet schools
and targeted open enrollment programs within individual school districts and between two or
more school districts. Individual districts need incentives because they face numerous
disincentives to integrating schools that often lead to segregated schools even in districts which
value the academic and civic benefits of integrated schools. Multi-district programs need
incentives because both sending and receiving districts incur costs when participating in such
programs. An existing program—the Choice is Yours Program—illustrates that modest financial
incentives are enough to bring potential receiving districts into the programs. It also
demonstrates how sending districts—Minneapolis in this case—can be hurt if they do not also
receive incentives.
A competitive grants strategy could also be used to improve the current funding mechanism.
Districts could be required to submit proposals for specific integrative programs. This approach
would be particularly well suited to Greater Minnesota because many school districts outside the
metropolitan area do not have enough schools to use the attendance-boundary, magnet or open
enrollment strategies encouraged by an incentive-based formula and distances are often too great
to accommodate inter-district strategies.
Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Districts
The Twin Cites currently has three large-scale multi-district collaboratives—the West Metro
Education Partnership (WMEP), the East Metro Education District (EMID), and the North West
Suburban Integration School District (NWSISD). By many measures, these districts have
impressive programs. WMEP and EMID both run several integrated, high performing schools
which are available to students across their member districts. NWSISD runs a program that
provides students transportation to magnet programs across its district. All three districts run
programs geared to promoting integration in classrooms and educating teachers.
These kinds of programs are particularly important because inter-district segregation—
differences between districts—is responsible for the bulk of segregation in the Twin Cities
metropolitan area. However, inter-district programs are currently relatively limited in scope.
There are currently over 100 non-white segregated schools in the Twin Cities with more than
40,000 students. By comparison, the two magnet schools administered by WMEP only enroll
about 1,000 students.
If integration districts are to actually serve a significant role in integrating schools within their
boundaries—both within and between their member districts—the consortiums’ powers and
programs will have to be expanded by the state legislature.
Segregation is a region-wide issue. However, most would agree that a seven-county integration
district would be too large—covering too much territory for unified planning and too large to be
administratively efficient. For these reasons, a single district organized into administrative
regions or, possibly, multiple integration districts which, combined, encompassed all or most of
the seven-county area make the most sense. The districts would have to be large enough to
provide full potential to integrate the region’s schools but small enough to allow for reasonable
transportation costs.
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A region-wide integration district—or a system of four or five districts—would not have one
“silver bullet” available to solve all problems. Instead, the district could engage in several
activities, each with the potential to lessen segregation. These might include:
• Metro Magnets: new magnets designed to both maximize integration and allow districts
to offer students access to different curricula than they can offer within individual
districts in an integrated setting.
• Coordinating District-Run Magnet Schools. It will still often make sense for districts,
especially large districts, to operate their own magnets aimed primarily at their own
students. However, an uncoordinated system of magnets could also produce needless
duplication. The integration district(s) would be the logical clearinghouse for approval of
local proposals for new magnets. The regional district could also work with member
districts to ensure that already-existing magnets fit into the regional system.
• Metro Job Center Magnets: Another way to attract students from across the metro is to
offer specialized magnet schools at large, high-density job centers, like Minneapolis’
central business district or parts of the I-494 corridor. Magnet schools at job centers have
tremendous integrative potential and can be an attractive alternative for commuters. Since
parents often commute across significant distances, it makes sense that these job center
magnets be available to students on a metro-wide basis and be run by a metro integration
district. Job center magnets can also maintain integrated student bodies by enrolling
students whose parents work in the job center while guaranteeing a certain number of
seats to students who live in a designated attendance zone that is near the job center.
• Oversight of Member District Integration: Oversight over school desegregation efforts is
currently vested in the Minnesota Department of Education. Many school advocates have
been critical of numerous aspects of the state desegregation rule, including the scope of
the current rule and the efficacy of the department’s efforts. Vesting this power instead in
integration districts could be a highly contentious issue to some districts. However, there
could be advantages to member districts in granting some oversight of boundary-making
decisions to a metro integration district.
Policies to Reduce Segregation: Affordable Housing Programs
The placement of affordable housing is a critical part of neighborhood segregation.
Concentrating affordable housing in racially segregated or poor neighborhoods deepens
segregation. By encouraging construction of affordable housing units in such neighborhoods,
many government housing programs contribute to residential segregation.
Affordable housing programs funded through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program
(LIHTC) and the HUD Section 8 Program have a great deal of potential to contribute to efforts to
reduce economic and racial segregation in Twin Cities neighborhoods. This means that they also
have great potential to reduce school segregation.
Both of these programs currently concentrate their efforts disproportionately in high-poverty
neighborhoods. Simulations show that if, instead, the overall number of LIHTC and Section 8
affordable housing units were distributed to all parts of the region in proportion with population
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and if units were assigned randomly by race (or in a pro-integrative fashion), then segregation in
the region’s schools could be greatly reduced.
Conclusions
The time is ripe for new approaches to integration in the Twin Cities. Past practices are largely
failing. Students of color in Twin Cities schools are more and more likely to be isolated in nonwhite segregated schools. These schools are overwhelmingly poor—more than nine out of ten
non-white segregated elementary schools have poverty rates above 40 percent and more than
seven out of ten show rates above 75 percent.
The current situation in schools exacerbates the performance gap between white and non-white
students. Growing school segregation also accelerates neighborhood segregation, which in turn
feeds back to further increase segregation in schools.
To break the vicious cycle, we must deal with school and neighborhood integration on a regional
scale. The Twin Cities has been well served by a rich tradition of regional policy-making in other
policy areas. It is time to extend these efforts to schools and housing.
The infrastructure for reform is in place—the integration revenue program provides a pool of
funds to support local efforts; existing integration districts provide the framework and experience
for a larger, improved system; and existing federal housing programs are large enough to make a
serious dent in the problem with only modest reforms.
Finally, the last piece of the puzzle—the political will to act—may also be in place. Legislators
on both sides of the aisle in the Minnesota House and Senate have expressed support for reform
to refocus the Integration Revenue Program. And officials in each of the Integration Districts and
affected Superintendents have suggested that the current system needs reform. Many of the
primary actors thus agree that the time to act is now.
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I.

Introduction

Segregation in schools and neighborhoods are closely related. Segregated neighborhoods, of
course, generate segregated neighborhood schools, but there is also feedback from school
characteristics to neighborhoods. Potential residents, especially families with children, evaluate
local schools when deciding where to live. This means that racial or social transition in
schools—and the record shows that schools can change character very rapidly—can accelerate
neighborhood transition. By the same token, stably integrated schools can stabilize
neighborhoods. Integrated neighborhoods are much more stable in metropolitan areas with largescale school integration programs.
This means that, to be successful, housing and school policy must be coordinated. Attempts to
integrate schools while ignoring housing segregation or to integrate housing while ignoring
school segregation are doomed to failure.
At the same time, purely local approaches to integrate schools and neighborhoods have very
limited potential in a region like the Twin Cities with more than 200 municipalities and school
districts. When just a few cities and school districts are home to the overwhelming majority of
residents and students of color, a truly effective integration strategy must be regional in scope.
This policy brief shows the existing pattern of segregation in the Twin Cities, summarizes the ills
associated with these patterns and describes how a coordinated regional approach to integration
using already existing programs could greatly reduce these ills.
The highlighted policy areas are integration revenue, integration districts and affordable housing
programs. Each of these policy areas relates directly to reforms currently or recently under
debate in the Minnesota legislature:
• Integration revenue. This is a state program designed to finance more effective
integration programs in Minnesota schools, but which virtually everyone agrees needs
reform. An alternative incentive-based funding formula designed to reward school
districts showing real, measurable pro-integrative outcomes in their schools and
classrooms would better direct these resources to areas where they are most needed and
toward policies that produce concrete outcomes.
• Integration districts. There are currently three integration districts in the Twin Cities
comprised of several school districts each. Each has come under fire in recent years,
largely because they are not empowered to pursue comprehensive pro-integration efforts.
A wider approach engaging a greater share of the region would have much greater
potential to create and nurture stably integrated schools over the long term.
• Affordable housing. The Twin Cities is known as a region which uses its federal
affordable housing funding—Low-income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and HUD
Section 8 projects and vouchers—progressively to promote more affordable housing in
suburban areas with strong economies and schools. However, even though the region
compares relatively well with other parts of the country, the distribution of housing under
these programs is still skewed toward central, low-income, segregated neighborhoods.
The numbers show that even relatively modest changes in the distribution of units funded
under these programs could have profound effects on schools and neighborhoods.
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II.

Segregation in the Twin Cities

Following the release of the 2000 Census, scholars from all disciplines were eager to celebrate
the decline of racial segregation in the nation. Study after study documented the decline in broad
measures of racial segregation in many metropolitan areas during the 1990s. In the Twin Cities,
for instance, the most commonly used general measure of neighborhood segregation, the
dissimilarity index, fell from 62 in 1990 to 58 in 2000, suggesting that, in some sense,
segregation had declined by six or seven percent.
There are two problems with this very general assessment. First, broad measures like the
dissimilarity index fail to capture the increasing complexity of race in America. And second,
even very broad measures show that segregation is increasing in schools. A closer look at racial
segregation in metropolitan areas reveals disturbing trends. In today’s more racially diverse
society, a new type of segregation is emerging for communities of color. This new type involves
segregation of non-whites from whites rather than of individual races from whites.
As racial diversity expands in the metropolitan area, different communities of color are mixing
with each other in non-white segregated schools and neighborhoods but not with whites. While
fewer whites are in predominantly white schools and neighborhoods, more people of color find
themselves in non-white segregated schools and neighborhoods. As a result, segregation is
increasing for most students and residents of color, even as it is declining for whites.
Segregation Trends
School segregation is a serious and increasing problem in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Racial segregation in schools is important because experience shows us that it creates drastically
different education experiences for children of color than for white children. Non-white
segregated schools are also largely high-poverty schools. In 1992, less than two percent of
elementary schools in the Twin Cities (or 9 schools) were non-white segregated. By 2008, this
had increased to 23 percent (108 elementary schools).1 In 2008, 96 percent of these schools had
high poverty rates (a share of free and reduced-price lunch eligible students greater than 40
percent) and 73 percent had very high poverty rates (a share of free and reduced-price lunch
eligible students greater than 75 percent).
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At the same time, the number of integrated schools increased. By 2008, 37 percent of the
region’s students were in integrated schools, up from 22 percent in 1992. However, this increase
essentially reflected the fact that white students are now much less likely to attend all-white
schools. Between 1992 and 2008, the percentage of white students in segregated schools fell
from 87 to 60 percent. (Chart 2) But, at the same time, the percentages of black and Hispanic
students attending non-white segregated schools shot up from 14 to 51 percent for black students
and from 3 percent to 43 percent for Hispanics.
Overall, the data show that a new type of segregation is emerging in schools. Students of color
are increasingly attending segregated schools with other students of color and not with whites.
As white students experience further integration, more and more students of color attend
segregated schools.
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Chart 2
Percentage of Students in Segregated Settings by Race,
Twin Cities Metropolitan Area
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Being isolated in non-white segregated schools hurts students of color because these schools
typically have high concentrations of poverty. In 2008, the average poverty rate in the non-white
segregated schools in the Twin Cities metro was more than seven times the rate in predominantly
white schools and three times the rate in integrated schools. (Chart 3)
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As a result of these trends, students of color in the Twin Cities metro are more than five times as
likely to attend schools with high concentrations of poverty (free/reduced price eligibility > 40
percent) as white students—56 percent compared to 10 percent. (Chart 4) The comparison is
even starker for very high poverty schools (free/reduced price eligibility > 75 percent). Students
of color are more than thirty times as likely as white students to find themselves in very high
poverty schools—29 percent compared to less than 1 percent. (Chart 5)

100

Chart 4
Percentage of Students Attending Schools with High Poverty
Rates (Free or Reduced Price Lunch Rates > 40%), 2008
Twin Cities Metropolitan Area

80
62
54

60

49

56

51

40
20

10

0
Black

Hispanic

Asian

Native
American

White

Total NonWhite

Source: Minnesota Department of Education.

100

Chart 5
Percentage of Students Attending Schools with Very High Poverty
Rates (Free/Reduced Price Lunch Rates > 75%), 2008
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The Geography of Segregation
The effects of segregation are felt much more dramatically in some parts of the region than in
others. Segregated schools are not randomly scattered across the metropolitan area. (Map 1)
Non-white segregated schools are highly concentrated in just a few areas—in the two central
cities and a few suburbs south and northwest of Minneapolis for the most part.
Map 1
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The current pattern reflects dramatic changes during the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this
time non-white shares increased dramatically in parts of the suburbs, especially in inner suburban
school districts. (Map 2) Racial change was extraordinarily rapid in many cases. Non-white
student shares increased by more than 60 percentage points in just over 10 years—from the 20s
to the 90s—in some suburban elementary schools. (The following map will be replaced next
week with a map showing changes from 1995 to 2008.)
Map 2
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Racial segregation does not only isolate non-white students by race, it also isolates them in highpoverty schools. Non-white segregated schools are almost invariably also high-poverty schools.
(Map 3)
Map 3

8

III.

Why Does Racial Segregation Matter?

Racial Segregation Undermines Equality of Opportunity
Racial segregation is not just about race. It is also about access to jobs, good schools, and decent
economic prospects in life. Where one lives significantly determines the availability and quality
of opportunities such as public education, employment, and wealth accumulation and thus
dramatically impacts one’s life chances. To the extent that racial segregation limits people’s
residential choices, it undermines equality of opportunity.
Access to opportunities varies significantly by race and income in most metropolitan areas.2
Metropolitan housing markets sort people by both race/ethnicity and income. This process
inevitably creates unequal access to opportunity. Past research by IRP shows that communities in
the region fall into several distinct categories based on characteristics directly related to
opportunities available to residents—population growth, job concentrations, poverty, and local
government tax capacities and service costs.3 The results show that the Twin Cities region shows
a great deal of diversity in community types, especially in the suburbs. Just under half of the
region’s households live in the two central cities and “stressed suburbs”—places showing clear
signs of fiscal stress and other indicators of low-than-average opportunities,
However, the proportion of people of color living in the central cities and stressed suburbs is
dramatically higher. Over three quarters of the region’s residents of color live in central cities
and stressed suburbs—communities that offer very limited opportunities to their residents. In
contrast, only two fifths of the region’s white residents live in these low-opportunity
communities.
On the other side, just over half of the region’s households live in communities with
characteristics associated with moderate or high levels of opportunity. But only a quarter of the
region’s residents of color live in these communities compared to almost three fifths of the
region’s white residents.
Racial segregation in neighborhoods is particularly harmful because it creates segregation in
schools, adding another layer of costs for young people, undermining the region’s future. There
are a number of reasons to be greatly concerned about segregation in the region’s schools and to
pursue coordinated policies to increase integration in our schools.
Integrated Schools Help Students
Integrated schools boost academic achievement, attainment, and expectations; improve
opportunities for students of color, and generate valuable social benefits. Integrated schools also
enhance the cultural competence of white students and prepare them for a more diverse
workplace and society.
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Attending racially integrated schools and classrooms improves the academic achievement of
minority students measured by test scores.4 Minority students graduating from desegregated
schools tend to complete more years of education, have higher college attendance rates, and tend
to choose more lucrative occupations in which minorities are historically underrepresented.5
Minority students who attended integrated schools have higher incomes than their peers in
segregated schools.6 Both white and non-white students tend to have higher educational
aspirations if they have cross-race friendships.7
Students who experience interracial contact in integrated school settings are more likely to live,
work, and attend college in more integrated settings.8 Integrated classrooms improve the stability
of interracial friendships and increase the likelihood of interracial friendships as adults.9
Interracial contact in desegregated settings decreases racial prejudice among students and
facilitates more positive interracial relations.10 Students who attend integrated schools report an
increased sense of civic engagement compared to their segregated peers.11
Integrated schools make sense not only from a moral point of view but also from an economic
point of view. Giving all children a fair start with the choice to attend opportunity-rich middleclass schools helps create the skilled workforce metropolitan regions need to replace impending
baby-boom retirements. During a period of skilled labor shortages nationwide, today’s students
are the next generation of workers who will replace these retirees. 12
While the retirees of the Twin Cities region will be 90 percent white, the region’s next
generation of workers will be 75 percent white.13 Segregated schools and a wide gap between
white and non-white graduation rates will not yield the skilled workers needed for the region’s
economy.14 Even if not morally moved by fairness to offer genuine educational opportunity to all
children, the region cannot ignore the costs of failing to educate all of its children.
Integrated Schools Help Communities
If school integration involves all of a region’s socio-economic groups, its benefits can extend
from students to neighborhoods. When implemented on a metro-wide scale, school integration
can promote residential integration and enhance neighborhood stability.15 If parents know that
their children will attend an effective, integrated school regardless of where they live, they will
be less likely to flee racially mixed or changing neighborhoods. This improves the odds that
integrated neighborhoods will remain integrated, making it easier to prevent resegregation,
neighborhood decline, and the costs associated with segregation.
Between 1970 and 1990, regions with metro-wide school desegregation plans had residential
segregation decreases twice the national average.16 Research reported below also demonstrates
that large-scale school desegregation enhances neighborhood stability. The findings reveal that
integrated neighborhoods become more likely to resegregate than to remain integrated once their
share of non-white residents reaches a relatively modest level. In contrast, in metropolitan areas
with large scale school desegregation plans, integrated neighborhoods are more likely to stay
integrated than to resegregate regardless of their initial racial composition.17
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Metro-wide plans prevent two problems that can make small-area plans counter-productive.
First, metro-wide plans reach beyond areas of residential segregation to include enough schools
and students to ensure that all schools can be effective middle-class schools. Second, they
prevent the destructive consequence of concentrating desegregation efforts in only a few lessaffluent white neighborhoods that often already are struggling to maintain racial balance and
stable integration. By asking every school to educate a small share of low-income children, a
region prevents further concentration of poor children and eliminates the need for families to flee
untenable poverty enrollments.
In contrast, desegregation plans affecting only a small portion of a metro region, usually a central
city, trigger greater residential segregation and worsen school segregation. This is the case
because a single-district desegregation effort typically isolates schools where the majority of
students are low-income and non-white and encourages flight to near-by districts.18
Desegregation plans covering small geographic areas enable racially identifiable schools to
persist.19 When school desegregation plans do not cover a sufficiently large scale, real estate
practices and preferences remain school-identified and race-based. 20
Integration is Necessary for Regional Vitality
Racial and economic segregation destabilize communities and undermine their economic vitality
by triggering a process of disinvestment in these communities. This process of disinvestment
reduces housing values and drives out the businesses generating jobs and tax base. In addition,
racial segregation and concentration of poverty impose a number of social costs on communities,
inflating the expenditure side of their fiscal ledgers. Communities are put in a double bind, as
racial segregation and concentration of poverty sap their fiscal capacities while their financial
obligations accelerate as a result of growing social costs. As a result, they become less
competitive in the market place.
Racial and economic segregation impacts various types of communities in the region. Many
neighborhoods in the central cities have already been hard hit by the disinvestment caused by
segregation. Once a problem confined to central cities, racial and economic segregation is now a
regional concern, threatening the vitality of different types of suburban communities. Schools,
which are powerful indicators of a community’s health, are already experiencing social and
economic changes which signal growing segregation in stressed suburbs.
However, stressed suburbs are not alone in experiencing these disturbing segregation patterns.
Such patterns are emerging even in some higher-income, suburban job centers that are in close
proximity to the stressed suburbs of the region. These suburban communities face the risk of
decline unless they can preempt spreading racial and economic segregation before it undermines
the vitality of their communities.
A metropolitan area jeopardizes its competitive edge and long-term quality of life by permitting
segregation to damage educational opportunity and neighborhood stability in its central cities and
adjacent suburbs. The success of a region’s central cities and suburbs tends to move together.21
Vibrant central cities can be engines of growth for metropolitan areas.22 Population growth and
economic growth correlate for both cities and regions.23 In addition, economic growth in a large
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central city can have positive spillover effects of one to two percent on its suburbs for every one
percent increase in the central city.24

IV.

Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Revenue

The Minnesota Legislature established the School District Integration Revenue Program in 1997
to provide funding to school districts for integration-related activities. The program distributed
roughly $85 million to 80 school districts statewide in 2007—about $75 million of the total went
to districts in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Schools and school district receive integration funds as part of the K-12 education formula and
their eligibility is based on their “protected student”—i.e. non-white student—populations.
School districts are eligible to receive integration funding if they fulfill one of four criteria: (1) if
they have at least one “racially identifiable school;” (2) if they are a “racially isolated” district;
(3) if they are adjacent to a racially isolated district; or (4) if they work with a racially isolated
district on a voluntary basis even if they are not an adjoining district.
The Duluth, St. Paul, and Minneapolis school districts receive a fixed amount of the integration
revenue ($206, $445, and $445 times the adjusted pupil units for the school year
respectively). These districts receive funding regardless of the sufficiency of the plans to
use the integration revenue dollars. All other districts receive different per-student funding
rates depending on their specific eligibility criteria. The total amount of integration revenue they
receive depends on their total enrollment and the per-student funding rate for which they are
eligible.
Map 4 shows the distribution of funds to Twin Cities metropolitan area school districts under the
program. Funding is focused on the central cities with the remaining funds cast widely across
suburban districts, including some districts with relatively modest non-white student populations.
Racially isolated districts are required to establish a multidistrict collaboration council with the
adjoining districts to develop an “integration plan” to improve cross-district integration
opportunities. School districts, other than Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, with racially
isolated schools are required to draft a budget detailing how expenditures will be used
specifically to support increased opportunities for interracial contact.
The current program has a number of shortcomings. The most important limitation of the
program is the ambiguity of its main goal. The program’s stated goal is to promote “interracial
contacts.” School districts have taken this term to mean a wide range of integration-related
activities ranging from one-day multicultural activities to inter-district magnet schools and crossdistrict transportation. The goal of the program needs to be clarified to unambiguously and
directly encourage physical integration of school districts, schools, and classrooms.
Currently, the primary use of integration revenue in Minnesota appears to be to provide extra
funding for poor and minority schools in the form of ESL teachers, support staff, and teacher
training. While these are worthy purposes, integration revenue funding currently provides little
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or no incentive for school districts to desegregate their minority and low-income students. As a
result, in practice, the program ends up providing an extra source of funding to cash-strapped
districts that maintain segregation.
Map 4

In addition, as noted by a report from the Office of the Legislative Auditor, the program has
some unintended and potentially negative consequences. Among other problems, the formula
contains a financial disincentive to fully eradicate segregation in schools because school districts
would no longer receive integration revenue once schools are fully integrated.
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Revisions to the program passed by the legislature in 2009 did little to rectify these issues. The
primary changes were to add reduction of the racial achievement gap as a goal of the program
and to tighten up the process by which the state department of education reviews local
integration plans.
A proposal to reform the integration revenue program
Integration Revenue is extra funding that is meant to promote integration in Minnesota school
districts with racially isolated schools. In fact, the current program provides little or no incentive
for school districts to desegregate their minority and low-income students. To meet its original
goals, the purpose of the funding should be changed from “increasing interracial contact” to
promoting the actual integration of school districts, schools, and classrooms.
One very efficient way to do this is to use the funding formula to create incentives for districts to
integrate schools by rewarding school districts on a per student basis for documented prointegrative student movements. This focuses school district efforts on outcomes and does not
require complicated regulations about how districts should spend the money. If a district uses
this year’s allocation as a windfall available to fund general operations, its pro-integration are
likely to falter, leading to less-integrated schools in the future, leading to less funding. (This, of
course, does not preclude state rules governing spending under the program, but the outcome
orientation reduces the need for such regulations.)
School districts face numerous disincentives to integrating schools, including parent resistance
and transportation costs. These disincentives frequently lead to segregated schools, even in
districts that understand the academic and citizenship values of integrated schools. It is important
that incentives are structured so that schools are rewarded for integrative measures.
The approach proposed here is provide separate incentives for intra-district efforts, inter-district
programs, and the number of students in integrated schools.
Intra-district integrative efforts would be rewarded by providing extra revenue for integrative
student movements among schools within the district. Included would be moves by white
students from predominantly white-assigned schools to integrated or predominantly non-white
schools and moves by students of color from predominantly non-white-assigned schools to
integrated or predominantly white schools. Districts might encourage such moves by a variety of
methods, including opening integrated magnet schools, creating intra-district open-enrollment
programs that allow students assigned to one neighborhood school to attend another school in the
district, or by using special programs within schools—such as baccalaureate or languageintensive coursework—to bring students from across the district to specific schools.
The majority of school segregation in the Twin Cites is the result of segregation between school
districts, rather than between schools within individual district. Until housing patterns become
truly integrated on a regional scale, integrating schools will require that some students cross
district boundaries. Integrative programs, such as the Choice is Yours program, have shown that,
when incentives are attached to integrative moves, school districts are very willing to accept
students.
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However, sending districts—Minneapolis, in the case of the Choice is Yours—which participate
in a inter-district programs now face a financial penalty when students move out of the district.
(Although the associated enrollment decline also reduces costs, the cost reduction will almost
inevitably be less than the loss of revenue, because of fixed costs, hiring-firing rules and other
factors.)
The proposed plan would avoid this problem by compensating both receiving and sending
districts when pro-integrative inter-district moves occur. Both participating districts would get
extra revenue when a white student from a predominantly white-assigned school moved to an
integrated or predominantly non-white school in another district, or when a student of color from
a predominantly non-white-assigned school moved to an integrated or predominantly white
school in another district.
Finally, school districts would be rewarded for creating pro-integrative attendance areas with a
financial incentive providing extra money for students in schools meeting a predetermined
definition of racially integrated schools.
Simulating the outcomes of incentive-based reform
Map 5 and Table 1 show the results in the Twin Cities metropolitan area of a program with a
three-part incentive like that described above. The simulation provided school districts with:
• $2,250 per pro-integrative intra-district move. For the purposes of the simulation, only
students attending integrated magnets were counted as integrative moves. Data limitations
prevented counting other types of pro-integrative moves across attendance boundaries.
• $2,250 per pro-integrative inter-district move (provided to both the sending and
receiving districts). This amount is commensurate with what is provided to most receiving
districts by the Choice is Yours program, an incentive that has proven adequate to get suburban
districts to participate in the program. For the purposes of the simulations, only students
participating in the Choice is Yours program were counted. Data limitations prevented counting
other types of pro-integrative moves across district boundaries.
• $250 per student in integrated schools. Integrated schools were defined as schools with
non-white enrollment shares between 25 and 75 percent.
The results of the simulation show that changing the program in this way would focus the
program more on the districts with the greatest potential to achieve results—central city and
inner suburban districts with substantial non-white enrollments—without disrupting revenue
streams to the districts which now rely most heavily on the program.
Revenues would be spread more evenly across inner suburban districts with significant nonwhite student populations. The exceptions are Brooklyn Center and Fridley which would receive
large increases per student because of existing magnet programs. At the same time, Minneapolis
and S. Paul would not suffer significant revenue declines because each district has significant
numbers of students in integrated magnets and traditional schools.
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Overall, the simulation shows that the integration revenue can be re-focused on what should be
its central goal—increasing the number of students in integrated schools—without disrupting the
finances of districts currently receiving funds or increasing total funding under the program.25
Map 5
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Source: Minnesota Department of Education and various local school districts.
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V.

Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Districts

The Twin Cites already has three large-scale multi-district collaboratives—the West Metro
Education Partnership (WMEP), the East Metro Education District (EMID), and the North West
Suburban Integration School District (NWSISD). By many measures, these districts have
impressive programs. WMEP and EMID both run several integrated, high performing schools
which are available to students across their member districts. NWSISD runs a program that
provides students transportation to magnet programs across its district. All three districts run
programs geared to promoting integration in classrooms and educating teachers. Map 6 shows
the boundaries of the current integration districts.
These integration collaborative districts, however, have not been entirely successful. The districts
have not prevented the segregation and resegregation of schools in their member districts.
Districts within all three collaboratives have made segregative boundary decisions and the
integration districts currently do not have the power to greatly influence these kinds of decisions.
This inability is a serious shortcoming.
While intra-district decision-making is important, inter-district segregation—differences between
districts—explain the bulk of segregation in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. The
collaboratives’ inter-district desegregation plans are therefore potentially very important.
However, these programs are relatively limited in scope. The scale of segregation in the Twin
Cities is large—there are currently more than 100 non-white segregated schools in the region, for
instance—and the three integration districts can only provide integrated education to a limited
number of students. For example, the two magnet schools administered by WMEP only enroll
about 1,000 students. Further, under-participation, often by the wealthiest and whitest districts,
also undercuts the integrative potential of the districts.
For integration districts to actually serve a significant role in integrating schools within their
boundaries—both within and between member districts—the consortiums’ powers and programs
will have to be expanded by the state legislature.
While the three inter-district collaboratives have had some successes in increasing the amount of
school integration across the metro, these districts cannot remedy segregation. School and
residential segregation occur on the metro level, not the district level. Attempting to remedy
school segregation in one sector of the metro-region without addressing it in others seems likely
to create conditions for school resegregation in the rest of the metro. Further, even school
districts within inter-district collaborations have been continually expanding magnet school
programs, often at great expense, to keep students in their district or attract students from other
districts. This competition for students is costly and can be counter-productive.
Metro-wide school districts have successfully stabilized metropolitan regions. Very large school
districts operate very successful integrated school systems in places like Wake County, North
Carolina and Louisville, Kentucky. Large school districts allow for greater planning efficiencies
and minimize the opportunity for white flight. This helps districts maintain stably integrated
schools in the face of increasing regional diversity. Metro-wide school districts also make
cooperative planning with local or regional land-use planning agencies much more feasible and
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efficient. In the Twin Cities, the ability of the Metropolitan Council to control urban sprawl,
implement fair-share, affordable housing initiatives and to protect the environment could be
greatly enhanced if coordinating its activities with local education decisions—like where to build
new schools—involved dealing with a single metro-wide agency instead of 50 or 60 individual
school districts.
Map 6
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Why do we need a broader regional approach to school integration?
Stably integrated schools are an essential component of any effort to truly integrate the places
where we live and work. Many neighborhoods that are integrated at a given time are actually in
transition. Segregated neighborhoods, in contrast, tend to remain segregated. The combination of
these two trends limits the extent to which neighborhoods can remain stably integrated.
However, stably integrated school systems can affect these trends dramatically.
Long term data for the Twin Cities show these patterns very clearly. IRP’s research shows that
56 percent of Twin Cities neighborhoods that were integrated in 1980 became segregated by
2000. At the same time, 83 percent of the neighborhoods that were segregated in 1980 in the
region were still segregated two decades later.26
The resegregation of once-integrated neighborhoods shows a common pattern: as a
neighborhood’s non-white population share increases, it becomes more and more likely to
segregate. The higher the share of non-white residents in a neighborhood, the greater is the
likelihood that the neighborhood will eventually become segregated.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship for neighborhoods in the 25 largest metropolitan areas that
were black/white integrated in 1980. The figure includes three lines each corresponding to
neighborhood transition status. The solid red line shows the percentage of white-black
neighborhoods that remained integrated from 1980 and 2000. The blue line shows the percentage
of white-black neighborhoods that became non-white segregated by 2000. Finally, the dotted line
shows the white-black neighborhoods that became predominantly white by 2000.
Figure 1
Housing Segregation - 2000 Status of 1,943 Tracts that were White/Black
Integrated in 1980 in the 25 Largest Metros
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Conclusion: When the Black population share was 30% or greater in 1980, the tract was
more likely to resegregate during the next 20 years than it was to remain integrated.
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On the horizontal axis, the figure shows the black population shares in 1980, ranging from 10
percent to 50 percent, percentages representing the lower and upper limits for a neighborhood to
be classified as white/black integrated in the system used for the analysis. The solid red line
crosses 50 percent at 30 percent black. This means that a white-black integrated neighborhood
that was 30 percent or more black in 1980 was more likely to make the transition to one of the
segregated categories than it was to remain integrated during the next 20 years.(The results are
similar for other types of integrated neighborhoods.)27
In contrast, creating the same chart for the 15 metropolitan areas that had large-scale regional
integration programs (region-wide or county-wide in the primary county) in schools during this
period shows how region-wide school integration policies can stabilize housing patterns.28 In
these metropolitan areas, neighborhoods that were white-black integrated in 1980 were more
likely to remain integrated during the next 20 years than to resegregate regardless of the initial
racial mix. In other words, even neighborhoods that were very close to 50 percent black—the
upper limit to be designated integrated in 1980—were more likely to remain integrated than to
make the transition to segregated. Apparently, white households are less likely to flee racially
mixed environments if they are confident that their children will continue to attend integrated
schools even if the racial mix of the neighborhood changes.
Figure 2
Housing Segregation - 2000 Status of 633 Tracts that were White/Black
Integrated in 1980 in 15 Metro Areas with County- or Metro-wide Busing in the
1980's and 1990's
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Conclusion: Tracts were more likely to remain integrated than to resegregate during the
next 20 years from all starting points.
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The neighborhood dynamics illustrated by Figure 1 put many of the school districts in the Twin
Cities at risk. (Table 1) Sixteen school districts, mostly in inner and middle suburbs, had nonwhite student shares in the 20 to 40 percent range where resegregation rates approach or exceed
the percentage of schools that remain integrated in Figure 1. Another five suburban districts
already had non-white shares above 40 percent.

Table 1

Source: Minnesota Department of Education.

What would a regional integration district look like?
Segregation is a region-wide issue. However, most would agree that a seven-county integration
district would be too large—covering too much territory for unified planning and too large to be
administratively efficient. For these reasons, a single district organized into administrative
regions or, possibly, multiple integration districts which, combined, encompassed all or most of
the seven-county area make the most sense. The districts would have to be large enough to
provide full potential to integrate the region’s schools but small enough to allow for reasonable
home to school trip lengths.
Map 7 shows potential boundaries for a five “super-district” option. The map shows that creating
districts that are balanced (by race) is a relatively straightforward exercise. The racial geography
of students in 2008 meant that simply dividing the region into five roughly equal zones would
have generated districts with roughly equivalent racial mixes. The hypothetical super districts
range from 64,286 to 96,378 students in size and the non-white share of students range from 30
22

percent to 36 percent. The proposed districts also roughly equalize poverty across the districts
with free and reduced price lunch eligibility ranging from 26 percent to 34 percent. (In 2008,
actual non-white shares ranged from 3 percent to75 percent across the region’s school districts
and free and reduced price lunch eligibility rates ranged from 5 percent to 71 percent.)
The map also shows that simply creating the super districts does not solve all problems. The
highly-segregated pattern of schools in the region means that, even with a region-wide district
divided into five administrative zones, the distances over which students would have to travel to
fully integrate the system are daunting. Clearly attendance zone decisions within districts could
not do the job alone.
What would a regional integration district do?
A region-wide integration district—or a system of four or five districts—would not have a
“magic bullet” policy to solve all problems. Instead, the district could engage in several
activities, each with the potential to lessen segregation.
Metro Magnets: High-quality magnets provide one avenue for metro-wide integration. The
metro integration district could create new magnets designed to both maximize integration and
allow districts to offer students access to different curricula than they can offer within individual
districts in an integrated setting.
School districts, even school districts in integration districts, have been continually expanding
magnet school programs, often at great expense, to keep students in their district or attract
students from other districts. This competition for students is costly and, ultimately, counterproductive. Combining a regional integration district’s capabilities with new financial incentives
for “sending” districts in the Integration Revenue formula (described in the previous section)
could greatly enhance the opportunities available to metro students. Offering specialized magnet
schools on a metro-wide basis would provide parents with specialized choices that could not be
supported by a single district and allow truly forward thinking programs to emerge.
The fundamental principle of WMEP admission policies provide a model for how these magnets
could be run. Each WMEP school district contributes a proportionate number of students to the
magnets. There have been some problems with how this has played out—some districts have not
contributed their full allotment of students and the student groups sent to the magnets have not
always been representative of their home districts—but the incentives that create these problems
can be at least partially remedied with the reforms of integration revenue described above.
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Map 7

Coordinating District-Run Magnet Schools: School districts face conflicting incentives in
sending students (and their attendant state funding) to inter-district magnet schools. While the
districts are presumably happy to offer more choices to their students, losing students means lost
funding and, potentially, public criticism for being unable to maintain home district enrollments.
While these disincentives can be eased by reforming the integration revenue program, it will still

24

often make sense for districts, especially large districts, to operate their own magnets aimed
primarily at their own students.
Allowing districts to run their own magnet schools also makes sense for other reasons. In
particular, a regional system that combines region-wide magnets with district-level magnets is
the likeliest way to encourage innovation and a wide variety of magnets. However, an
uncoordinated system could also produce needless duplication. The region-wide integration
district would be the logical clearinghouse for approval of local proposals for new magnets. The
regional district could also work with member districts to ensure that already-existing magnets fit
into the regional system.
Metro Job Centered Magnets: Another way to attract students from across the metro is to offer
specialized magnet schools at large, high-density job centers, like Minneapolis’ central business
district or parts of the I-494 corridor. Magnet schools at job centers have tremendous integrative
potential and can be an attractive alternative for commuters. Job center magnets allow working
parents to more easily attend parent-teacher conferences, after school events, and to pick their
children up after work. In other metros, parents who send their children to job-center magnets are
actually able to lunch with their children. Since parents often commute across significant
distances, it makes sense that these job center magnets be available to students on a metro-wide
basis and be run by a metro integration district. Job center magnets can also maintain integrated
student bodies by enrolling students whose parents work in the job center while guaranteeing a
certain number of seats to students who live in a designated attendance zone that is near the job
center.
Oversight of Member District Integration: Oversight over school desegregation efforts is
currently vested in the Minnesota Department of Education. Many school advocates have been
critical of numerous aspects of the state desegregation rule, including the scope of the current
rule and the efficacy of the department’s efforts. The existing integration districts could, even
under the current desegregation rule, pressure their member districts to adopt integrative
boundary solutions. However, the inherent conflict-of-interest between the integration district’s
interest in integration and the board members’ allegiance to their own districts may explain why
the collaborations generally don’t weigh in on boundary decisions. Changing the board
leadership structure might remove some of the conflicts of interest, but the collaborations would
still have no power to stop non-integrative boundary decisions. Unless it was given the power by
the legislature, it could still only advise districts.
Losing some power over boundary decisions could be a highly contentious issue to some
districts. However, there could be advantages to member districts in granting some oversight of
boundary-making decisions to a metro integration district. For instance, altering boundaries often
involves costs for expensive outside consultants because it is not economic for individual
districts to build this capability. At a larger scale—the metro scale—the economics could be
different. In addition, in select cases, the power to draw boundaries that cross district lines could
be used to alleviate crowding in one district by sharing facilities with an adjoining district,
potentially preventing unnecessary construction of new school facilities in one district while
capacity is underutilized (or schools are closed down) in another.
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How would a regional integration district be organized?
Because of the diversity of interests and the wide variety of responsiblities within potential
regional (or subregional) integration districts, participation in the metro-integration district
would have to be mandatory. If individual districts could opt out of the district or of specific
programs, then the integration district’s viability would be threatened every time non-unanimous
decisions were made. Inevitably, there would be specific issues where individual districts felt
that the benefits were outweighed by costs, even when region-wide net benefits were substantial.
The current boards of the inter-district collaboratives are comprised of the superintendents of
each of the participating districts. This is widely regarded as unwieldy. The current structure
creates conflicts of interest for the superintendents, uses too much of their time, and gives
disproportionate power to smaller districts. Conflicts of interest are a clear problem with the
current board structure. For instance, it is very hard to envision a superintendent approving a
measure which penalizes a segregative boundary decision on the part of his or her home district.
In the best scenario, board members should have a single formal affiliation—to the metro board.
It makes sense that each school district be represented by a board member. However, unless the
board is made very large, this creates a proportionality problem. A one member-one vote system
(like the current one) gives disproportionate power to small districts. There are several ways to
create a more stable board. An elected board could be comprised of one member from each
district elected solely to serve on the metro board during regular school district elections. Each
member’s vote would then be weighted by the district’s percentage of total students. While board
members would still represent districts, they would not feel the same intensity of conflict of
interest that the superintendents now face. Alternatively, a board could be appointed by the
legislature, another state agency, or be appointed by the school districts. The advantage of a
board appointed by an outside actor, such as the state, is that it would not face the same conflicts
of interest that a school district appointed board would have. Appointed members, however,
should not be selected existing school boards.

VI.

Policies to Reduce Segregation: Affordable Housing Programs

The placement of affordable housing is a critical part of neighborhood segregation.
Concentrating affordable housing in racially segregated or poor neighborhoods deepens
segregation. By encouraging construction of affordable housing units in such neighborhoods,
many government housing programs contribute to residential segregation.
In 1970, the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) created site and
neighborhood standards to ensure that its housing programs complied with the requirements of
the 1968 Fair Housing Act. These standards explicitly prohibit the construction of new
affordable housing in racially segregated neighborhoods. Since the early 1970s, however, HUD
has weakened the enforcement of these anti-segregation measures by establishing major
exceptions to the standards.29 These exceptions significantly eroded the integration potential of
existing affordable housing programs such as public housing and the Section 8.
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Meanwhile, many new affordable housing programs that emerged in recent decades do not have
measures to prevent segregation in neighborhoods. In fact, programs such as the Low Income
Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and the Community Reinvestment Act intensify segregation by
providing incentives to construct low-income housing in poor neighborhoods which tend to be
racially segregated.30 HUD also carved out significant exceptions to the site and neighborhood
standards in several of its important new programs, such as Hope VI and Housing Opportunities
Made Equal (HOME). As a result, these programs tend to perpetuate residential segregation in
metropolitan areas as well.31
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program
The LIHTC program is the largest federal program that supports building low-income housing.32
Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the program provides over five billion dollars a year for
the construction, acquisition or rehabilitation of low-income housing.33 The program allows
investors in residential rental property to claim tax credits for the development or rehabilitation
of property to be rented to low-income tenants. While the Internal Revenue Service regulates the
distribution of tax credits, state housing finance agencies make the decisions to fund specific
projects and administer the allocation of tax credits.
The program provides incentives to promote the construction of low-income housing in
“qualified census tracts,” which HUD defines as tracts “in which 50 percent or more of the
households have an income which is less than 60 percent of the area median gross income for
such year or which has a poverty rate of at least 25 percent.”34 As a result, many state agencies,
including Minnesota’s, have allocated significant numbers of credits to areas with high
concentrations of minorities and people with low incomes.35
While the distribution of LIHTC units in the Twin Cities metro is less concentrated in the core of
the region than in most metropolitan areas, the location of these units appears to be prointegrative in only a very few places.36 Since the inception of the LIHTC program,
approximately 5,000 LIHTC units have been located in Twin Cities suburbs and an equal
number have been located in the central cities.37 Although this fifty-fifty split seems “fair,” it
does not reflect the fact that Minneapolis and St. Paul represent just 23 percent of the region’s
total population.
Map 8 shows the location of LIHTC units in Minneapolis and the surrounding school districts. It
is clear that these units are disproportionately located in Minneapolis neighborhoods, where the
share of minority and low-income residents are already high. The map also highlights the
concentration of LIHTC units within Minneapolis in “qualified census tracts,” demonstrating
how the program’s incentives to locate units in these tracts contributes to residential segregation
within Minneapolis as well.
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Map 8

The distribution of households of color who live in the LIHTC units further contributes to
residential segregation in the metro. As Map 9 shows, this distribution is heavily skewed toward
the central cities and stressed inner suburbs. Among the households living in LIHTC units,
people of color have been much more likely to locate in the cities than in the suburbs. For
instance, sixty-five percent of the black households in LIHTC units are in the central cities,
compared to just 50 percent of the total LIHTC units in the cities.
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Map 9

The skewed distribution of households of color within LIHTC units worsens racial segregation
not only in neighborhoods but also in schools. Map 10 shows the racial composition of the
LIHTC unit occupants with children by unit site. The map demonstrates that majority of the
LIHTC households of color with children are located in racially segregated central cities or in
stressed suburbs that are in racial transition.
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Map 10

Map 11 shows the highly segregated nature of the elementary school attendance zones in areas
where majority of the LIHTC households of color with children reside.
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Map 11

Overall, these patterns mean that affordable housing provided under the LIHTC program
concentrates low-income households in racially segregated or transitioning neighborhoods and
further intensifies school segregation by creating more racially identifiable schools with very
high poverty enrollments.
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The Section 8 Program
The distribution of low-income housing under the Section 8 program also contributes to
residential segregation in the region. Like the LIHTC units, low-income housing units and
vouchers provided by the Section 8 program are located disproportionately in the central cities
and stressed inner suburbs, where the shares of minority and low-income residents are already
high. Similarly, the distribution of households of color who have access to housing through the
Section 8 program is also heavily skewed toward the central cities and stressed inner suburbs.
The project-based Section 8 program was the primary federal low-income housing program from
1974 to 1983. Under this program, HUD provided assistance to public housing authorities and
private owners for 20 to 40 years after construction or substantial rehabilitation of low-income
rental units.38 During the nine years it was in effect, the project-based Section 8 program
produced over 750,000 new or substantially renovated subsidized housing units nationwide, an
average of about 83,000 per year, many of which still function as low-income housing today.39
Map 12 shows the size, location, and racial composition of project-based Section 8 units in the
Twin Cities region. Project-based Section 8 units are disproportionately in the central cities and
inner-ring suburbs. In 2004, the central cities had 4,079—55 percent—of the region’s 7,484
project-based Section 8 units.
Map 12 also shows that the distribution of residents of color in these units was skewed toward
the central cities and inner suburbs. For instance, while 55 percent of the project-based Section 8
units were in the central cities, 69 percent of project-based Section 8 households who were black
were located in the central cities.
The other Section 8 program—vouchers—was intentionally designed to promote housing choice
and mobility for low-income residents. Despite this, it also contributes to segregation by
concentrating low-income residents in racially segregated, high poverty neighborhoods. Under
the Section 8 voucher program, the administering public housing authority (PHA) pays a
landlord the difference between 30 percent of household income and the PHA-determined
payment standard—about 80 to 100 percent of the fair market rent. Section 8 vouchers are
portable; a tenant who receives a voucher in one jurisdiction can take it to another for use.40

32

Map 12
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In 2004, there were 17,109 Section 8 vouchers used for housing in the Twin Cities. The vouchers
contributed to residential segregation because, as Map 13 shows, they were used
disproportionately in the central cities and stressed suburbs. The central cities contained less than
23 percent of the region’s population but they had 47 percent of the metro’s Section 8 vouchers.
Map 13
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The program also concentrated minorities in the central cities and stressed inner suburbs because
households of color using the vouchers were more likely to locate in these areas (Maps 13 and
14). Fifty-eight percent of black households used their vouchers in the central cities while only
46 percent of all the Section 8 voucher users were located in the central cities.
Map 14
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The skewed distribution of project-based Section 8 units and Section 8 vouchers not only leads
to further concentrations of race and poverty in neighborhoods but also generates more racially
identifiable schools with high poverty enrollments. By locating low-income residents of color
and their children in highly segregated elementary school attendance zones, the Section 8
program intensifies school segregation in the region. A comparison of Maps 11, 12, 13 and 14
clearly shows the geographical overlap between the distribution of Section 8 housing and the
location of segregated school attendance zones.
As the Federal housing programs and the state housing agencies that administer these programs
concentrate affordable housing units in the central cities and stressed inner suburbs, they skew
the regional distribution of affordable housing, intensify the spatial mismatch of jobs and
affordable housing in the region, and undermine the employment opportunities of people of color
and low-income residents. Map 15 clearly illustrates the uneven geographical distribution of all
affordable housing units in the Twin Cities region, with the highest affordability rates
concentrated in the core.
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Map 15

Chart 6 breaks down the availability of affordable housing by various community types in the
region. While low-opportunity communities such as the central cities and the stressed suburbs
had roughly half of the region’s total housing stock, they had nearly three quarters of the region’s
housing units affordable to people with 50 percent of the regional median income. In contrast,
the moderate- and high-opportunity communities had just a quarter of the region’s affordable
housing compared to half of the region’s total housing units.
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Chart 6
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In prior work, IRP estimated the potential effects on school integration of different types of
housing policy reforms.41 For the purposes of these simulations, an integrated school was defined
as one with a black enrollment between seven percent and 35 percent. Seven percent represents
one-half the regional average share for black students, and 35 percent is a share often used to
approximate the point at which continued racial transition is very likely.
In 2005, 375 of the roughly 1,000 schools in the seven-county region showed black student
shares in the seven to 35 percent range; 443 showed shares less than seven percent and 184
schools had shares above 35 percent. If integrating all schools was achieved simply by having
students of appropriate races in the appropriate schools trade places, then roughly 9,900 black
students in schools above the 35 percent ceiling would have to trade places with 9,900 white
students in schools below the seven percent floor. However, a choice program would be unlikely
to result in one-for-one trades across schools.
If, instead, only 50 percent of the black students leaving predominantly black schools were
replaced by white students then about 12,500 black students would have to re-locate to
predominantly white and already-integrated schools in order for all schools to be below the 35
percent ceiling. If none of the black students leaving segregated schools were replaced by white
students, then the number would increase to 15,250.
Thus, there is no single magic number of student moves that would result in integrated schools
across the entire region. But 12,500 represents the middle of the range, and was used as the
starting point for evaluating the potential impact of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) and the project-based Section 8 programs.
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Table 2 shows the potential impact of making two integrative changes in the LIHTC and Section
8 programs.42 If LIHTC and project-based Section 8 units were assigned randomly by race, there
would be an additional 1,527 black students in the suburbs―738 due to the LIHTC program and
789 due to Section 8. If, in addition, LIHTC and Section 8 units were located in proportion to
population, there would be another 1,956 black students in the suburbs―655 due to the LIHTC
program and 1,301 due to Section 8. These changes alone could have brought the region nearly a
third of the way to the goal of integrated schools—3,483 (738 + 789 + 655 + 1,301) more black
student would reside in the suburbs.
The location-specific race data needed to repeat the LIHTC and Project-based Section 8
simulations for the Section 8 voucher program is not available.43 However, at a very general
level, if the distribution of vouchers were changed to reflect population shares, then there would
be 4,750 more Section 8 vouchers used in the suburbs than is currently the case. At current
average rates for the region as a whole, this would mean an additional 2,215 black households in
the suburbs. This data suggests that there is probably as much potential for the Section 8
vouchers to affect school desegregation efforts as for each of the other two programs shown in
Table 2. If this is the case, then adding Section 8 vouchers to the simulations would bring the
totals in Table 2 up to roughly 50 percent of the number of students needed to achieve the goal of
integrated schools across the entire seven-county region.
Table 2
Metro School Integration Scenarios
Number of black students who would have to change schools in order to
achieve racial balance.

Number of additional black students who would already be in a racially
integrated school if:
•
LITHC units were assigned randomly by race.
•
Section 8 project units were assigned randomly by race.

Number of additional black students that would already be in a racially
integrated school if:
•
LIHTC units were distributed across the region in proportion
to school enrollment.
•
Section 8 project units were distributed across the region in
proportion to school enrollment.
Additional Section 8 vouchers in the suburbs if they were distributed in same
proportions as school enrollment.

12,580

738
789

655
1,301

4,750

Source: Computed from Minnesota Department of Education data.
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It is clear that these simulations represent fairly rough estimates. However, the fundamental
message is equally clear. Given the actual distributions of affordable housing under these
programs and of students in Twin Cities schools, relatively modest housing policy changes have
the potential to make a serious dent in school segregation. Further, many of these very worthy
programs currently have long waiting lists for participation. If they were expanded to levels
commensurate with demand and modified to reflect the modest changes included in the
simulations, these programs have the potential to create something very special in America—a
stably integrated regional school system.

VII.

Conclusions

The time is ripe for new approaches to integration in the Twin Cities. Past practices are largely
failing. Students of color in Twin Cities schools are more and more likely to be isolated in nonwhite segregated schools. These schools that are overwhelmingly poor—more than nine out of
ten non-white segregated elementary schools have poverty rates above 40 percent and more than
seven out of ten show rates above 75 percent.
The current situation in schools exacerbates the performance gap between white and non-white
students. Indeed it could be argued that economic segregation like what we now see actually
creates the gap. Growing school segregation also accelerates neighborhood segregation, which in
turn feeds back to further increase segregation in schools.
To break the vicious cycle, we must deal with school and neighborhood integration on a regional
scale. The Twin Cities has been well served by a rich tradition of regional policy-making in other
policy areas. It is time to extend these efforts to schools and housing.
The infrastructure for reform is in place—the integration revenue program provides a pool of
funds to support local efforts; existing integration districts provide the framework and experience
for a larger, improved system; and existing federal housing programs are large enough to make a
serious dent in the problem with only modest reforms.
Finally, the last piece of the puzzle--the political will to act—may also be in place. Legislators on
both sides of the aisle in the Minnesota House and Senate have expressed support for reform to
refocus the Integration Revenue Program. And officials in each of the Integration Districts and
affected Superintendents have suggested that the current system needs reform. Many of the
primary actors thus agree that the time to act is now.
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